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This article discusses the issues in the design of a representational system for music. Following decisions 
as to i~he primitives of such a system, their time structure and general structuring isdiscussed. Most of the 
issues are presented as controversies, using extremes to clarify the underlying problems. Associating time 
intervals and their constraints with the components ofmusical structure turns out to be essential. These 
constraints on time intervals model an important characteristic of musical knowledge and should be part 
of the representation, i.e. part of the syntax. It is concluded that a representation f music should, in the 
short run, be made as declarative, xplicit and formal as possible, while actively awaiting representation 
languages that can deal with the presented issues in a more flexible way. 
KEY WORDS: Representational systems, music representation, knowledge representation, temporal 
representations, structure. 
Introduction 
This article describes a number of important issues in the representation of music 
with respect to the structuring ofmusical information. The set of issues presented 
is in no way complete, but indicates the most influential decisions that have to be 
taken in the representation of structure. The identification f the problems i central 
and there will be no speculation on possible solutions. The discussion will be 
restricted to the descriptive issues of music representation, concentrating on its 
primitives and their structuring. Of course, a purely technical description of a 
representation of music is not sufficient; its cognitive aspects should be incorporated 
as well. Although adiscussion on the modeling of the "musical mind" is not the aim 
here, a cognitive viewpoint will add an essential perspective in the identification f
the issues in the design of a general representation of music. Since a representation 
of the real world (represented world) has to do with cognition, the image (representing 
world) will have most of cognition's characteristics. 
In the cognitive sciences, and in particular subfields like computational psychology 
and artificial intelligence, the use of computational models (or representational 
systems) iscentral. Their merits, together with the proposal of the term "cognitive 
science", were described by Christopher Longuet-Higgins a : 
[...] it sets new standards of precision and detail in the formulation of models of cognitive processes, 
these models being open to direct and immediate test. (Longuet-Higgins, 1973) 
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The hope is that hese formulations will contribute to a new theoretical psychology. 
Apart from the discussion whether a computational psychology ispossible at all, 
a computational theory sets an important foundation: by describing a theory in 
terms of a formal system, together with its interpretation, it can be used to define 
what is faulty or inadequate (i.e. it can be falsified) and might help us in defining 
what kind of theoretical power we actually need. Or, as Margaret Boden states: 
It provides astandard of rigour and completeness to which theoretical explanations should aspire (which 
is not to say that a program in itself is a theory). (Boden, 1990, p. 108) 
Representation is an essential part of such a formal system and decisions made in 
its design will undoubtedly influence the behavior of the computational model, 
embodying the theory. It is these decisions, to be made with regard to a 
representational system of music, that this article is aiming at. 
Different perspectives 
A number of different areas of research ave a direct interest in specifying an 
appropriate r presentation f music. The latter either forms the basis of their studies 
or is a subject of study in itself. In the following short overview the different 
viewpoints and their specific demands will be described. The main difference is
contained in the distinction between representations of a technical nature and 
representations of a cognitive nature (conceptual or mental representations). 
Music analysis and production 
Musicology 
Notation has always played a central role in musicological research. The design and 
adaptation of notations or representations have been developed along with the 
specific theories of analysis. Different overlapping or contradicting theories have 
been proposed (Schenker, 1956; Meyer, 1973; Narmour, 1977; Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 
1983). Most theories agree that there is more in music than what is written in the 
score. In this sense, the opinion of the philosopher Nelson Goodman (1968) that a 
piece can be characterized as the set of performances in conformance with its score 
is an exception. The question here is whether a piece of music resides in the notation, 
in the air, or in people's minds, or in other words, whether music is cognitive or not. 
Computer music 
In the field of computer music there is an interest in the design of appropriate data 
structures for music systems that form the basis of, for example, composition tools, 
interactive systems, and notation systems. Several projects have proposed ifferent 
kinds of representation, suited to the specific demands of the particular problem or 
even to the software or hardware used (see Loy, 1988 for an elaborate survey of 
computer music systems). A distinction can be made between representations 
designed for real-time systems that are process-oriented (e.g. Puckette, 1988), and 
non-real-time systems that have a static global view of the music (e.g. Dannenberg, 
1989). They differ, respectively, in their tacit and explicit representation f time (see 
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below: The representation f time). 
All systems have their own way of representing music and share little common 
ground. The only widespread standard is the industry proposed MIDI standard: 
a communication protocol (described in Loy, 1985) and file format. It is a very low- 
level stream-like and structureless representation (criticized in Moore, 1988) 
designed for communication between electronic instruments and computers. 
Within the computer music community several initiatives (Dannenberg etal., 1989; 
ANSI, 1989) have been taken towards amore general and high-level representational 
standard. 
Music publishing and retrieval systems 
In music archiving the need for the standardization f notated music has resulted 
in several proposals for the storage and printing of music (Erickson, 1975; Byrd, 
1984; Gourlay, 1986). Most of them are based on a visual description (e.g. notes 
positioned on staves) and are not very general in their applicability. The ANSI 
standardization committee for music representation (ANSI, 1989) is a recent 
attempt to make a technical and methodological specification for a standard music 
description language, useful in areas such as music publishing, music databases, 
computer assisted instruction, music analysis, and music produ.ction. In general, 
these standards seem to concentrate more on pragmatics (e.g. efficiency, in terms 
of size and speed requirements) than on generality and consistency. 
AI and cognitive modeling 
Another large area of research is artificial intelligence (AI) and the cognitive 
sciences. Both have their own specific goals and demands. I will describe them here 
briefly. 
AI and knowledge r presentation 
In AI the concern is to notate descriptions of the world in such a way that an 
intelligent machine can come to conclusions about its environment by formally 
manipulating these descriptions. In knowledge representation, a subfield of AI, 
research isfocussed on th e development of representation languages and the design 
of inference schemes (e.g. to model reasoning about knowledge). Both are based in 
the tradition of (predicate) logi0 while more recent languages can be classified as 
structured object representations (e.g. frames; Minsky, 1975), associational 
representations (e.g. semantic networks; Quillian, 1968), and procedural  
representations and production systems (Newell, 1973). It is important to note that 
AI and knowledge representation are about feasible ways to build intelligent 
systems and not so much about modeling cognitive behavior. AI and music is also 
an important field of research where representation is becoming one of the central 
issues (Balaban et al., 1991). 
Cognitive and computational psychology 
In the cognitive sciences, mental and knowledge representations are important 
subjects of study. It seems impossible to imagine a cognitive system in which a 
representation does not play a central role (Anderson, 1983; Fodor, 1983; Johnson- 
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Laird, 1983). There is, however, no general agreement on the assumption that 
mental activity is mediated by internal or mental representations, and when there 
is, there is still some discord on the precise nature of these representations. 
Proposals for knowledge representation can be grouped into three categories: 
propositional representations (discrete symbols or propositions), analogical repre- 
sentations (use of images), andprocedural representations (i.e. modeled as proc- 
esses or procedures). To this last category also belong distributed representations 
(e.g. connectionist networks). 
Music perception a d cognition 
In the psychology of music, alongside research in music production and compre- 
hension, the majority of work has consisted of describing the nature of musical 
knowledge and its representation. Elaborate studies have been done in the domains 
of pitch (Krumhansl, 1979; Shepard, 1982), rhythm (Povel & Essens, 1981; Longuet- 
Higgins & Lee, 1984; Desain & Honing, 1989) and timbre (Grey, 1977; Wessel, 1979). 
But here also, there is no general agreement on the precise nature of these 
representations (see McAdams, 1987 for a more complete overview or Sloboda, 
1985; Dowling & Harwood, 1986). 
General approaches to representation 
This paragraph will outline the main approaches torepresentation. Identifying the 
problems of representation in general will be shown to be of direct benefit o the 
debate concerning music representation. 
Knowledge representation hypothesis 
An important assumption i  a formalist approach to representation is the knowledge 
representation hypothesis. It is summarized by Brian C. Smith (1982) as follows: 
Any mechanically embodied intelligent process will be comprised of structural ingredients hat a) we as 
external observers naturally take to represent a propositional ccount of the knowledge that the overall 
process exhibits, and b) independent ofsuch external semantical ttribution play a formal but causal and 
essential role in engendering the behavior that manifests that knowledge. 
Such a "mechanically embodied intelligent process" is presumed to be an internal 
process that manipulates a set of representational structures, in such way that the 
intelligent behavior of the whole results from the interaction ofparts. It is presumed 
only to react o the form or shape of these representations, without regard to what 
they mean or represent. 
As an illustrative xample one can use a technique that is sometimes used 
in making enlarged copies of pictures, for instance, by artists who make large 
chalk drawings of well-known paintings on the street. They copy these 
paintings from a small reproduction, holding it upside-down. This minimizes 
the distorting influence a perspective has on the copying of the actual 
proportions: an unwanted interpretation that imposes 'meaning' not present 
in the picture. This example shows that one has to watch out for interpretive 
knowledge,  so easily added by human observers, not present in the 
representation itself. A representation is only syntax and should have all 
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knowledge mbodied in this syntax, independent of the interpretive system. 
A representational system can be defined as "a formal system for making explicit 
certain entities or types of information, together with a specification of how the 
system does this" (Marr, 1982). In the formalist definition entities in a formal system 
might have complex mechanisms. 1 In deciding on any particular representational 
system and its entities, there is a trade-off; certain information will become xplicit 
at the expense of other information being pushed into the background making it 
possibly hard to recover. 
Procedural and declarative approaches 
There is a classic distinction between declarative and procedural ways of representing 
knowledge:declarative being the knowledge about something, while procedural 
knowledge states the knowledge in terms of how to do something. Declarative 
knowledge tends to be accessible: it can easily be examined and combined. 
Procedural knowledge tends to be inaccessible, guiding a series of actions but 
allowing little examination. We seem to have conscious access to declarative 
knowledge whereas we do not have this access to procedural knowledge (Rumelhart 
& Norman, 1985). 
Declarative representations have the merit of being composable i,e. the 
meaning of a complex expression is based on or can be derived from the 
meaning of its parts and their combinations. There are no interactions 
between separate entities, which makes the representation extremely modular. 
Knowledge can simply be added as long as it keeps the system consistent. All 
knowledge is open for introspection. 
In procedural representations the emphasis is on interaction. Procedural 
representations are, not surprisingly, very powerful in modeling knowledge that 
is procedural by nature. There is no separation between facts and processes. 
Interactions are strong but deriving semantics i very hard (if not impossible). 
Addition or change is only reached by modification (and a resulting debugging 
process). Introspection a d reflection isimpossible. The problem, here, is the way 
in which procedures can be represented so that they can be interpreted. The 
question becomes what hey do, instead of how they do it (see Table 1 for an 
overviews. 
Table I Procedural nd declarative knowledge representations compared 
Declarative knowledge Procedural knowledge 
accessible 
modular (no interaction) 
composable s mantics 
open to introspection a d reflection 
knowledge can easily be added, if consistent 
control structure obscure 
inaccessible 
interaction ( o separation between facts and 
processes) 
impossible (or hard) to derive semantics 
closed to introspection and reflection 
addition only by modification 
control structure xplicit 
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Mixed and multiple representations 
In general, the distinctions between procedural nd declarative r presentations are
about efficiency, control, modularity, and the accessibility of knowledge. For 
computer science the first two are most important, while cognitive psychology is
most interested in the last two. 
Terry Winograd (1975) emphasized the duality between modularity and interac- 
tion, interaction being a strong characteristic of procedural representations and 
modularity of declarative r presentations. Many complex systems can be viewed 
as "nearly decomposable systems", a notion introduced by Herbert Simon (1969). 2
A single module can be studied separately without constant attention to its 
interaction(s) with other modules. Interactions among these subsystems are weak 
but not negligible. In representational terms, this forces us to have representations 
that facilitate these weak interactions. Mixed representations (i.e. both modular and 
interactive), as described by Winograd and others, have been further developed in
the design of object-oriented languages (e.g. Minsky, 1975; Hewitt, 1975). In mixed 
representations different parts of the represented world are described in different 
ways. Some parts might be described procedurally, while others are described in 
a declarative way. 
Another approach is to have multiple representations of the same 'world', each 
describing the represented world completely. Instead of a mixture of, for example, 
procedural nd declarative r presentations, describing different parts of the world, 
there is a procedural representation describing the whole world and a declarative 
representation describing the whole world in parallel. Here the trade-off is extra 
power against the problem of coordinating the information i the separate repre- 
sentations: when a change is made, all structures have to be kept consistent so as 
to reflect he same represented world. 
Issues in music representation 
The remainder of this article will address issues pecific to the representation f 
music. Three sub-areas will be discussed: the primitives of a music representation, 
time structuring and general structuring. The notion of structuring depends on the 
possibility of decomposing a representation into meaningful entities, so we must 
first answer the important question: what are we structuring? 
The primitives: building blocks of a representation 
Decomposability 
How to decompose a representation f music into the appropriate parts? What are 
the building blocks, the primitives of sucha representation? As described earlier, 
this decision is essential nd has implications on what kind of information will be 
lost and what information will clearly be represented. 
There seems to be a general consensus on the notion of discrete lements (e.g. 
notes, sound events or objects) as the primitives of music. It forms the basis of a vast 
amount of music-theoretical work and research in the psychology of music, but a 
detailed iscussion and argument for this assumption is missing from the literature. 
In music theory, as Robert Erickson (1982, p. 533) points out, there is no clear 
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definition of what such a primitive object might be. In the psychology ofmusic, John 
Sloboda (1985, p. 24), for example, just states "the basis phoneme of music is a note", 
and Diana Deutsch (1982) founds her discussion on grouping mechanisms in music 
on a 'given' set of basic acoustic elements. Yet the essential question of what these 
elements or "phonemes' are is not answered. Research in psycho-acoustics on
streaming shows how difficult it is to decide on such elements from a perceptual 
point of view (McAdams & Bregman, 1979; Bregman, 1990). A distinction has to be 
made between atural and artificial discretization of dimensions, or, in other 
words, the existence of possibly innate perceptual mechanisms and a learned 
division of continuous ignals. In going from a continuous acoustic signal to a 
discrete signal one loses information. This quantization process hould be looked 
at as a separation process instead: both types of information, the continuous and the 
discrete, are needed, and probably interact with each other (cf. Desain & Honing, 
1989, with regard to this separation process in rhythm perception). So, next to 
decomposition, the issue of the characterization f the primitives of a representa- 
tion, as continuous, discrete or a combination of the two, is very important. 
Con'tinuous or discrete? 
By way of illustration, imagine BiUie Holiday singing "I cried for you." How can the 
sound be represented in such a way that all expressive and structural information 
is incorporated? What is the relation between the actual percepfion and the notes 
originally notated in the score? Consists the sentence as sung of several discrete 
entities, or should it be described in a continuous way? Or a combination of both? 
For example, discrete phonemes, yllables or notes, continuous expression over 
these discrete structural elements, continuous fluctuations of pitch and amplitude 
within them, etc. combined into several levels of discrete and continuous types of 
information that are closely related. 
In music cognition, the assumption of discrete lements finds a lot of support 
(McAdams, 1989). Stephen McAdams makes adistinction between three auditory 
grouping processes that organize the acoustic surface into musical events, connect 
events into musical streams, and 'chunk' event streams into musical units (simul- 
taneous, sequential and segmentational grouping, respectively); and perceived 
discrete qualities that arebased on learning (e.g. scale, meter, harmony) (McAdams, 
1989, p. 182). These discrete lements of music are assumed to carry structure, while 
the continuous aspects carry expression (Clarke) 1987). Mary Louise Serafine (1988) 
stands quite alone in arguing for a continuous basis. She blames music perception 
research for reducing music to~alse lements such as discrete pitches, scales and 
chords: "[they] are not the elements or building blocks of music" (p. 52). She 
accounts for these elements as an after-the-fact notion of music. But, as David 
Huron (1990) observes, these are speculative claims with no empirical support. It 
is clear that there is still quite a lot of discussion and research needed, especially on 
the rules of the segregation f acoustic signals, before we can decide on the discrete 
elements of a general representation f music. 
Currently, most music representation systems use either notes or sound events/ 
objects as the building blocks of their descriptions. In these systems, the distinction 
between continuous and discrete is normally between sound generation and the 
discrete vents which describe the sound in several attributes, or, in other words, 
between the instrument and the score. This division rests on the assumption that 
sound is continuous by nature (e.g. signals, wave forms), whereas the score is 
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mainly a collection of discrete vents. The continuous aspects of the score (e.g. 
timing and dynamics) are often taken care of by different kinds of procedures or 
'modifiers' (e.g. Pope, 1989; Dyer, 1990) acting on the score: their descriptions are 
not part of the score representation (see below: Granularity). The trade-off made in 
these decompositions is very little discussed or even acknowledged. 
The relations: issues in structuring 
When we have decided on the primitives of the representation, their structuring 
becomes of great importance. This structuring will be described in two separate 
sections. Since time and its structuring is an important factor in music, with its own 
specific issues related to it, it will be discussed separately from the issues in general 
structuring. However, in the end it will be shown that they are not very different. 
Time structuring will be discussed first. 
The representation of time 
A number of distinctions need to be made in trying to narrow down discussion of 
the representation f time. There are three different areas of interest: temporal 
representation, temporal logic or reasoning, and planning and scheduling. All of 
them influence the design of a representation f time. This section will concentrate 
on the first. 
The representation f time can be subdivided in three categories: 1)tacit (time is 
not represented at all); 2) implicit (time is represented, but explicit ime relations are 
not); and 3) explicit (time is represented with explicit ime relations). The issues will 
be spread over these categories. 
Tacit time structuring 
Some real-time systems can be called 'no-time' systems (e.g. Bharucha, 1987; 
Puckette, 1988). Because time is not explicitly represented in the primitives, there 
is only the notion of now. There is no explicit formulationof the systems dependence 
on time and no information regarding time (except 'now') can be derived or 
manipulated. 
Implicit time structuring 
In this category, time is represented without explicit time relations. Time is 
expressed in an absolute way (e.g. note lists (Matthews, 1969)) or relative to an 
arbitrary point of reference. Time relations (e.g. this note occurs before that note, 
or, these notes are overlapping) have to be calculated since they are not explicitly 
stated in the representation. 
Primitives: points vs intervals 
The decision to represent time as points or intervals i  not arbitrary, even when they, 
theoretically, can be expressed in terms of each other (an interval is a collection of 
points, a point is a very short intervalS). A point-based representation (McDermott, 
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1982) implies the occurrence of only one event at a time and lacks the concept of an 
event 'taking" time. As Allen (1983) argues, there seems to be a strong intuition that, 
given an event, we can always "turn up the magnification" and look at its structure. 
He therefore proposes an interval-based representation. I tervals form a strong 
basis for the computability ofmeaningful relations, i.e. time intervals that overlap, 
meet, are during, before, and after each other, etc. 
In music representation there are examples of both choices. Mira Balaban (1989), 
for instance, describes a representation based on pairs of a sound object and a time 
point, and Desain & Honing (1988) use sound objects with a duration (i.e. time 
interval) as the basis of a representation f time. 
Time base: absolute vs relative 
The time base that can be chosen is either absolute or relative, or, in other words, 
real-time (e.g. in seconds) or proportional time (e.g. a quarter note). With an 
absolute time base, (onset-)time is an attribute of the musical object, whereas with 
a relative time base it isn't. 
Some music representation systems (Smith, 1972; Schottstaedt, 1983) use lists of 
notes with absolute times, whereas later systems tend to describe time in terms of 
a relative time base or relative to the enclosing time context, i.e. expressed as a 
function of this context (Dannenberg, 1989; Balaban, 1989). But both time bases eem 
to be needed. For example, in representing a trill as being twice as long as another 
trill, one has to decide whether to stretch or to extend the description of this related 
trill i.e. is the new trill half the speed (using relative time) 3r is the speed the same 
(using absolute time) and are there just more notes added (or any other particular 
way of extending a trill). Both types of behavior, using both time bases, need to be 
represented toallow for both representations of time. 
Granularity: discrete vs continuous 
What is the grain or grid size of the time bases mentioned above? Is time expressed 
as a discrete value labeling events, or is it expressed as a continuous function? As 
well as discrete time, a continuous way of representing time is needed, for example, 
when representing an accelerando orrubato over a series of notes. 4Most represen- 
tational systems make these notions available as global operations acting upon the 
representation i stead of making them part of the representation. 
Explicit time structuring 
An example of explicit structuring in music is the use of two basic structuring 
relations called "parallel' and 'sequential' (Desain & Honing, 1988). These two time 
relations, and combinations of them, can express many constellations of discrete 
sound events. Similar time structuring is proposed by several other authors (e.g. 
Rodet & Cointe, 1984; Dannenberg, 1989). Allen (1983) describes a list of thirteen 
possible relationships. A set of basic explicit ime relations forms a solid basis for 
higher level notions of time structuring and make operations on time, or operations 
depending on time, very elegant (Desain, 1990). 
Controversy: declarative vs procedural 
The controversy over declarative and procedural representations is also very 
important in the representation f music. Take the example of a Trill - a sequence 
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of notes, alternating in pitch, filling up a certain time interval. This "filling up" is 
most naturally represented in a procedural form. But, as discussed previously, this 
type of representation has quite some disadvantages. Problems occur when there 
is, for instance, a nesting of these trills defined in terms of each other (e.g. a higher- 
level trill composed by combining the definitions of some other, i.e. lower-level 
trills): the definition of the high-level trill depends on the result of the low-level trills, 
a result hat is only available after execution of the procedural description of these 
low-level trills. There is no way in which the duration of the high-level trill can be 
decided upon without evaluating the definition of the low-level trills since this 
knowledge is represented in a procedural form. The declarative r presentation (a 
low-level trill of a certain length) has to be replaced by the result (a sequence ofnotes 
adding up to a certain length) and information is lost (e.g. knowledge on how the. 
trill was composed). Both kinds of representation seem to be needed in the 
representation f music. The marriage of both types of knowledge is, as described 
before, still a topic of research. 
The representation of structure 
Structural descriptions ofmusic can be divided into two areas. One is the descrip- 
tion of musical structure independent of psychological considerations, based on an 
analysis by a musicologist. The other is the description of the structural properties 
of mental representations of music: the goal of music psychology research. The 
described issues are relevant to both areas. In describing eneral structuring, we can 
employ the same division used in the subfield of time structuring: 1)tacit structural 
relations, 2) implicit structural relations, and 3) explicit structural relations. 
Tacit structural relations 
When no structure is represented, we are left with only the primitives of the 
representation. This is the case in the earlier mentioned MIDI protocol that 
represents a piece of music as a structureless tream of note-onsets and offsets (with 
as attributes an interger key number, avelocity value and channel number). 
Implicit structural relations 
Implicit are those structural relations that have to be calculated from the represen- 
tation. As an example, from a MIDI file format he following structural information 
can be obtained: all notes on channel I belong to one unit called a 'track'; every two 
seconds there is a bar and all notes within that time span are part of it; etc. The 
structural relations that can be derived from a representation (with only implicit 
structuring) depend heavily on the choice of primitives and their attributes. 
Explicit structural relations 
Structure isthe denominator for a large class of possible relations made between the 
entities of a representation. One can say that almost everything, except the entities 
themselves, is structure. Very few representational systems for music supply 
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explicit structuring mechanisms, and even when they are available, they only 
represent specific kinds of structure (e.g. meter, bars, instrumental parts) or support 
annotation (e.g. "this is an important note"). The following paragraphs discuss the 
issues in the design of a general structuring mechanism. 
What kinds of structural types are needed? 
One way of describing different kinds of relations - so as to have a handle to talk 
about them in a general way - is to divide them in binary and n-ary relations. A 
special kind of binary relation is a tree or hierarchy. A part-of relation defines uch 
a hierarchical relation between objects. It propagates behavior between objects. A 
part-of relation could denote relations uch as "all notes part-of chord", or the often- 
used bar, beat, and note hierarchy. They are quite general and flexible in describing 
musical structure (see Honing, 1990). 
Another hierarchical relation, orthogonal to the part-of relation, is the is-a 
relation. It defines inheritance of behavior and characteristics, specifying a gener- 
alization hierarchy of objects: a structure of concepts which are linked to those of 
which they are specializations. Examples are: a dominant chord being a special kind 
of sdventh chord, a chord being a kind of cluster, acluster being a kind of collection 
of notes, etc. (see e.g. Pope, 1989). 
A great number of music theories use hierarchies as their only kind of structuring 
(Lerdahl & Jackendo ff, 1983). Hierarchies are very useful in relating local and global 
information, but other kinds of relations are needed as well. Other binary relations 
like associative relations are useful in relating, for example, a theme with its 
variations. Functional relations are also needed (e.g. the function of a particular 
chord in a scale) as well as referential relations (e.g. a theme referring to a previously 
presented or already known motif). 
N-ary relations can structure more complex types of relation: for instance, the 
dependency ofa certain chord on scale, mode and the context in which it is used is 
a ternary relation. 
The structural types described here are the ones most relevant to music, though 
a complete overview of all musical constructs and their expression in these 
structural types would take considerably more space. 5 
Relations between musical constructs: generalization vs dedication 
Not everything is said about musical structure by simply assigning one of the 
structural types described above.Within one type of structure (e.g. defined in terms 
of part-of relations) refinement is needed to distinguish between the different 
musical constructs described b~y means of this type (e.g. what is the difference 
between a chord and a bar when both are described in terms of part-of relations?). 
There are two extremes in approaching this problem. One approach is dedication: 
all the well-known or often used musical constructs (chord, arpeggio, bar, beat, trill, 
grace note, etc.) are described, more or less ad hoc, as primitives with their own 
specific relations (and resulting behavior), with little or no hierarchy. The other 
approach is generalization and is based on parsimony: there are no special musical 
constructs defined as primitives, all constructs being based on some very general 
primitive (e.g. a time interval). The bias is on generality: new musical constructs 
have to be defined in terms of existing ones, in a hierarchical way. 
The first is a popular and .pragmatic approach. For instance, in a computer 
composition system areasonable set can be provided that takes care of most needs. 
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The main drawback isthat extensions have to be made in an ad hoc fashion and often 
need to have their own processes (or transformations) defined for the user to be able 
to access or manipulate them. 
In the latter approach the choice of the right generalities is the problem. But when 
they are available, extensions are simply defined in terms of these generalities or 
higher-level constructs. There is no need to 'tell' the processes, acting on the 
representation, about these new constructs. 
Direction: bottom-up, top-down or both? 
In expressing one of the above mentioned relations, it is important to note how the 
information flow is supported by the representation. I  music theory and the 
psychology of music, different directions are proposed: from the conceptual level 
down (top-down; Schenker, 1956), and from the low-level data up (bottom-up; 
Narmour, 1977), or in both directions, as in modeling tonal hierarchies with 
interactive activation etworks (Bharucha, 1987). 
MuSical structure: association with time intervals and their constraints 
essential 
In what way is musical structure different from any general structure mechanism 
(e.g. the part-of and is-a relations we described before)? Since time is an influential 
factor in most, if not all types of structure in music, musical structure can be 
described as a collection of structuring mechanisms that have time intervals 
asociated with their components (i.e. structural objects). Itis the constraints on these 
time intervals that specialize the different types of structuring. 
As an example, let's look at two simple part-of relations: bars, a bar, note (see 
Figure la), and a progression, chord, note hierarchy (see Figure 2a). In the first 
hierarchy it is clear that he structural object 'bars' and its parts have a duration: they 
hold for a certain time interval. This is also the case for the 'progression' object and 
its parts. Both constructs have the same part-of structure but differ in the kind of 
constraints hey have on their associated time intervals. In a "bars' structure, if one 
bar becomes longer, the other one has to become shorter: they have to satisfy the meet 
constraint (using Allen's (1983) terminology). In the "progression' structure, the 
comparable structural objects have a before relation. The musical constructs are 
characterized by the specific constraints on these time intervals associated with 
their structural objects (see Figure lb and 2b) 6. 
These constraints should be part of the representation, i.e.part of the syntax, so 
that operations on the representation produce the behavior esulting from these 
restrictions for free; the semantics ofmusical constructs (e.g. what does an arpeggio 
mean, and how does it differ from a chord or a run of notes) should be moved to 
the syntax. In this way the representation has embedded knowledge of how to deal 
with particular kinds of structure. These musical constructs can be compared with 
small machines: they have a clear and accessible behavior that cannot be altered. 
Multiple representations: power vs coordination and consistency 
Multiple representations are needed in a complete description of music, i.e. several 
structural descriptions being applied to the same primitives (e.g. a note is part of 
a meter and a tonal hierarchy at the same time). One could think of multiple 
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structural representations as analogous to a ring binder: the spiral resembles the 
primitives, the pages the different kinds of structural relations7 As described before 
(see General approaches torepresentation), the consistency and coordination ofthe 
information between the pages is the problem here. 
Inconsistencies may occur when two structural descriptions clash (i.e. the 
constraints on both structural descriptions can't be solved or unified) and excep- 
tional or preferred behavior to be provided. It seems that in these situations, the 
demand for consistency is too strong (e.g. a slowed-down chord structure might 
turn into an arpeggio). Itmay not be possible to formalize arepresentation f music 
in a way that guarantees consistency. 8 More research isneeded in the formalization 
of musical constructs (i.e. definition and behavior) and their combination that might 
result in exceptional or preferred behavior. 
Modularization: musical knowledge vs annotation 
Here the issue is whether structuring is used to add musical knowledge or just used 
as annotation. Structure can be used as an annotation of the basic elements of the 
representation assigning different kinds of information, but it can also be inter- 
preted as musical knowledge. Using structure in both ways facilitates modularity: 
not all knowledge about music has to be part of the representation, since structure 
can be used as a hook to import information from outside the system. This improves 
the modularity of the system considerably (as advocated by Simon (1969) in tech- 
nical terms, and by Fodor (1983) in cognitive terms). 
Conclusion 
Representational systems have a central position in the cognitive sciences, espe- 
cially in the fields of computational psychology and artificial intelligence. A
formalist approach to representation, as summarized inthe "knowledge represen- 
tation hypothesis", applied to the representation f music has turned out to be 
beneficial. Representing musical knowledge in syntactical terms, makes a theory 
within the psychology of music explicit and verifiable. Discussion the issues in the 
design of such a representational system for music is what this article has aimed at. 
Before talking about structuring, the question "what are we structuring?" was 
asked. The decomposability of a representation f music was discussed as well as 
the expression of its primitives in either discrete or continuous terms (or a 
combination thereof). Research in the segregation ofacoustical signals (Bregman, 
1990) is essential in deciding on the primitives of a general representation f music. 
Currently, most research is based on the assumption that the basic elements of 
music are discrete. 
The discussion of time structuring, as a special case of general structuring, 
showed that the choice of either points or intervals, a relative or absolute time base, 
discrete or continuous representations, and the use of procedural or declarative 
descriptions of musical knowledge are controversies where solutions through 
combining these polarities have to be found. 
Several types of general structuring were discussed. An important point is 
the observation that structure inmusic is often associated with a time interval 
(for which it "holds'). The constraints on these time intervals model  specific 
musical constructs and their behavior. Time structuring and general structur- 
ing differ in the sense that time structuring makes these constraints explicit: 
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they  are represented  as structura l  objects (e.g. 'paral lel"  and  'sequent ia l"  
relat ions),  wh i le  in genera l  s t ructur ing they are implicit:  they are used  to 
restr ict  he behav ior  of the specif ic structure,  but  are not  expl ic i t ly represented  
as s t ruc tura l  objects. 
In conclusion: 
1. A representat ion should be as formal as possible. Even when the meaning is 
removed f rom the formal system it must  be possible to prove its correctness (i.e. not 
dependent  on knowledge outside the formal definition). 
2. A representation should be as declarative as possible. Declarative representations 
were shown to have preference over procedural representations, even though some 
information is more natural ly represented in a procedural  way. 
3. A representat ion should be as explicit as possible; All relations and knowledge 
should be explicitly stated in the representation. 
4. All the controversies presented above need combined solutions in which both 
extremes can be expressed. The idea of having multiple representations of the same 
"world' seems useful. 
5. Musical structure should be associated with time intervals. Constraints on these 
t ime intervals" model  the specific musical constructs and their behavior. These  
constraints hould be part of the representation, i.e. part  of the syntax, so that 
operat ions on the representation get the behavior esulting from these restrictions 
for free. 
In the short term, it is concluded that it would be best to construct representations 
of music so as to be as declarative, explicit and formal as possible, while actively 
await ing developments  in representation languages or schemes that can deal with 
the issues presented here in a more flexible way. 9 
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Notes 
1. Distributed representations (e.g. connectionist networks), in this sense, manipulate symbols of an 
unusual kind. An individual unit of such network does not implement an identifiable symbol; a 
meaningful representation ly exist at a level made up of a number of units. 
2. Simon (1969) describes nearly decomposable systems a having the property "the short-run behaviour of
each of the component subsystems is approximately independent ofthe short-run behaviour of the 
other components" (p. 100). 
3. Allen's theory (1983), describes points as intervals that are durationless, i.e. a duration less than a value 
~, adjusted to the reasoning task. 
4. It has been shown that structure isessential inthe performance of the continuous and discrete aspects 
of musical time (e.g. Clarke, 1987,1988). Therefore a complete r presentation f time should facilitate 
the expression of these aspects in terms of structure to be of any perceptual or musical relevance (see 
Desain & Honing, 1991a). 
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5. A complete overview of all musical constructs will quite likely torn out to be a large, if not infinite 
collection, but they probably can be grouped into a considerably smaller set of proto-typical relations, 
with their specific haracteristics being modeled as refinements of a particular structural type (see 
issue on Musical structure: association with time intervals and their constraints e sential). 
6. The constraints on the time intervals, as shown in Figure lb and 2b, give a raw characterization of the 
example structures, just for comparison. For a more complete characterization of such structures the 
logic-based constraints ofAllen (1983) are not enough. Other kinds of constraints are needed as well 
to be able to express relations like, for example, allbars have the same length, or, a bar is half the length 
of "bars'. 
7. These pages could be of different shapes and material, standing for structural descriptions of a 
completely different nature. This analogy was stlggested by Morris Halle in a seminar at Sussex 
University in 1987 when talking about conceptual representations of linguistic structure. 
8. Recent work done in the field of artificial intelligence on non-monotonic logic and truth-maintenance 
might therefore be applicable to music. 
9. Since this article was written (autumn, 1990) work has been done on partial solutions of the issues 
presented above. Some of the issues on the representation of tiroe'have bt~en resolved in a generalized 
concept of time functions (Desain & Honing, in press). A proposal for a specification and trahsforma- 
tion formalism of expressive timing described in terms of structure ispublished as Desain & Honing 
(1991b). 
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